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Although much research has been conducted on annual income inequality in Russia, little has 
been know about longer-run measures of income inequality and on income mobility. Using the 
data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, this paper investigates income mobility 
in Russia during the period of rapid economic growth. Employing a broad set of mobility 
indices, we show that there is much mobility in household incomes from one year to the next in 
Russia. There is some evidence of greater mobility for those in the tails of the income 
distribution relative to the middle. However, income movements in Russia over this period are 
largely associated with transitory rather than permanent changes.  
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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
Most ordinary people and many policy-makers in Russia believe that Russian society 
resembles a layer-cake: the rich (the ‘top’ layer) stay rich; the poor (the ‘bottom’ layer) stay 
poor. Our study shows that this is not the truth. Russian society proves to be highly dynamic. In 
making our conclusions we rely on the Russian longitudinal monitoring survey (RLMS), using 
information on the households that were interviewed repeatedly over the period from 2000 to 
2005.  
It appears that most poverty is short-term; many people enter poverty and leave soon. For 
example, about 70-80% of those who started in the bottom tenth of the income distribution in 
2000 leaved this position by 2005. Things were much the same at the top end. The rich mostly 
did not stay rich, although they were a slightly more stable group than the poor: about 30% of 
those in the top tenth of the income distribution in 2000 preserved their positions by 2005. This 
in fact means that it is easier to get rich than to stay rich. There is another way to think about it. 
If incomes fluctuated completely randomly, half of those who started in the bottom tenth would 
finish the period in the top half of the income distribution and vice versa. In no-mobility case this 
fraction would be equal to zero. In Russia, 20% of those who started in the bottom tenth ended 
up in the top half five years later, and nearly the same percentage of those who started at the top 
tenth ended up in the bottom half. These figures suggest that inequalities are not fixed and people 
have chances to change their fortunes.  
Russia is notoriously known for reaching one of the highest levels of income inequality 
among middle income countries during the transition period. However, all the estimates cited in 
the inequality literature are based on cross-sectional data and are essentially the snapshots of the 
income distribution in a single time point. In a longer run mobility can effectively work to offset 
a larger part of inequality. If there is a lot of churning in the distribution as households move 
relative to one another, incomes averaged over longer time periods may be much more equally 
distributed than incomes from any single year. If we sum incomes over two consecutive years, 
then inequality goes down by 8-25%, depending on the measure of inequality used. Mobility 
does not operate equally at all points of the distribution: mobility smoothes out income 
differences mostly at the very top and the very bottom of the distribution. Over six-year period, 
due no mobility, inequality declines by almost 50% at the top, by 40% at the bottom and by 20% 
in the middle of the distribution.  
In assessing mobility one has to remember that high mobility is not necessarily a good 
thing which reduces differences in living standards, rather it is a double-edged sword. High 
mobility sometimes takes the form of large volatility in real incomes when significant shares of 
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population experience absolute declines or large increases in real incomes. This may result in 
economic insecurity and higher risks of dropping into poverty for the many. Significant 
reductions in inequality over longer time periods prove that the apparent high level of mobility is 
largely driven by transitory events. In other words, the high measured income mobility may be a 
sign of income instability. Income instability, in turn, may affect incentives to support economic 
reforms, accumulate human capital and start new businesses which may have negative long-term 
consequences for economic growth. 
Clearly, poor families and families just above the poverty line are especially vulnerable to 
income fluctuations because they often lack assets and access to credits to smooth their 
consumption. Therefore, improved social assistance can play a significant role in reducing 
income inequality. The decomposition of income changes by changes in income sources 
demonstrates that social transfers (except for pensions) to do not contribute much to stabilize 
variability of incomes over time. Most people of working age who escape poverty do so through 
the labour market rather than with government help.  
During the period under study (2000-2005), the Russian economy was enjoying a period of 
strong growth. The international empirical evidence on the effects of growth on inequality and 
relative position of the poor suggests that incomes of the poor rise at the same as average 
incomes do. We also find that (after correcting for short-term fluctuations in the data) Russian 
economic growth in the early 2000s in fact strong favored low-income individuals. However, 
this inequality-reducing effect was almost exactly offset by the effect of reranking. This means 
that with pro-poor income growth a number of individuals who were poor in the initial year 
moved out of low income, but were replaced at the bottom of the income distribution by 
individuals who were non-poor initially and who had slightly higher relative incomes in the final 
year of the period than those whom they replaced. Therefore, an overall reduction in cross-
sectional inequality was only modest.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The degree of income mobility is an important characteristic of how societies function. It 
determines the extent to which inequality in the short term translates into inequality over a longer 
time period and in life-time inequality. A higher level of cross-sectional inequality is of less 
concern if people can move up and down the economic ladder relatively easily. Higher income 
mobility suggests more equal opportunities and higher efficiency of various social ‘lifts’. 
Empirical analysis of income mobility may help understand why people's incomes follow 
different trajectories and be a guide for policy response. 
Understanding the levels of income mobility in Russia is especially relevant and of interest. 
Russia is notoriously known for reaching one of the highest levels of income inequality among 
middle income countries in the early transition period. Starting from relatively low levels in the 
pre-transition era, inequality peaked in the mid-1990s with Gini reaching 0.37-0.40 (Mitra and 
Yemtsov, 2006). This rapid increase of income inequality has received heightened attention 
among researchers (Buckley and Gurenko, 1997; Flemming and Micklewright, 1999; 
Commander et al., 1999; Kiruta and Sheviakov, 2001; Aivazian and Kolenikov, 2001). In later 
years inequality slightly declined with economic recovery. World Bank (2005) emphasizes that 
economic growth in Russia has been pro-poor and hence a major force of inequality reduction. 
Over the previous decade, some scholars studying Russian income ineaqulity turned from 
static to dynamic analysis, particularly regarding income mobility and poverty duration. Lokshin 
and Popkin (1999) show that a small percentage of Russia families are persistently poor; a 
sizable share of poverty is transitory and shallow, arising from income churning. Following this 
work, Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) use a non-linear model of distribution-dependent growth 
and find no evidence that short-lived shocks during the Russian trabsition caused permanent 
impoverishment and create poverty traps. Denisova (2007) demonstrates that economic growth 
importantly changes in- and out-of-poverty movements: it lowers risks to slip into poverty but 
also reduces chances to escape from poverty. Summing up the results of these poverty duration 
studies we conclude that there is substantial mobility in the low end of the Russian income 
distribution but the percentage of chronically poor among the poor seems to have grown in the 
recent years.  
Apart from studies focused on dynamic poverty analysis there are some papers 
investigating income mobility throughout the distribution. Bogomolova and Topilina (1999) 
study relative income mobility in 1994-1996 and report that about 40% of Russian households 
remained in their original income quintiles from year to year, while roughly 30% moved up and 
the same percentage moved down. Other studies listed below are mainly concerned with absolute 
income mobility and its decompositions. Jovanovich (2001) finds that, in spite of very modest 
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changes in the measured inequality in 1994-1998, Russian households experienced considerable 
fluctuations in their expenditures with the median absolute annual change in expenditures 
exceeding 50%. This suggests considerable amount of income churning from one year to the 
next. Luttmer (2000) declares that around half of these fluctuations reflect measurement error or 
transitory shocks. Gorodnichenko et al. (2008) extend analysis to 2005 and thus cover the period 
of economic recovery. They find that the measured fall in inequality since 2000 is largely 
attributable to the moderation of transitory shocks. 
Up to now and to the best of our knowledge there are no comprehensive studies that have 
tried to measure the degree and the pattern of mobility within the Russian income distribution. 
Moreover, existing studies, with the notable exception of Denisova (2007) and Gorodnichenko et 
al (2008), do not include the period of economic recovery. The aim of this paper is to establish 
some facts about income mobility in Russia in 2000-2005 filling the information vacuum which 
currently exists.  
We study in detail two aspects of mobility: relative mobility (reranking of individuals in 
the distribution) and absolute mobility (real income movements) with special emphasis on low-
income groups. However, our approach is very different from the one taken in classical 
“poverty” studies. Rather than tracking income changes for income groups defined as the poor 
(which is common in poverty literature), we track income changes for individuals. The 
composition of the poor group changes over time because some individuals fall into poverty and 
some escape it. The individuals classified as poor in 2000 might have experienced a diversity of 
income growth rates and few of these individuals are likely to be among poor in 2005. Our paper 
is also different from “chronic poverty” studies. Rather than dividing the sample into two groups: 
poor and non-poor and analyzing the movement between these two states, we take a broader 
approach in assessing the fortunes of the poor and look at the distributional effects of income 
growth of the poor. We follow Jenkins and Kerm (2006) who decompose the change in 
inequality into two components: the reshuffling of individuals in the income pecking order and 
the progressivity in income growth. The latter component indicates whether income growth is 
pro-poor, neutral or pro-rich. 
The main variable in our research are per adult equivalent incomes, but we use expenditure 
aggregates as alternative indicators of household well-being. To date, there are still very few 
papers on the implications of the choice of welfare aggregate on distributional dynamics (e.g., 
Gradin et al, 2008)1. Due to household’s ability to smooth consumption the use of income-based 
                                                 
1 However, contrary to their initial expectations, Gradin et al (2008) report that for Spanish household data incomes 
show less mobility than expenditures. This finding suggests that expenditures are not sufficiently smoothed which 
authors attribute to liquidity constraints. Alternative explanation is that most irregular incomes are the ones mostly 
underreported.   
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indicators would overstate mobility, especially in the short run. Moreover, different income 
groups are known to have different abilities to smooth consumption. Poor households and those 
vulnerable to poverty (e.g. young adults with children) often lack saving and financial assets to 
finance consumption during low income periods while richer households smooth consumption 
more effectively. Finally, data on consumption are believed to be more reliable than data on 
incomes. Households and individuals usually wittingly tend to underreport their incomes. Due to 
consumption smoothing recall errors among respondents tend to be inequality-reducing for 
expenditures and inequality-enhancing for incomes (Bound et al., (2001). Some households with 
diverse sources of income may feel difficult to recall all of them accurately. The net income from 
some activities (e.g. self-employment) may not be known. Income measures also do not include 
some non-income consumption items, the major item being consumption of own production.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
explains the construction of welfare aggregates. Section 3 estimates the effect of mobility on 
inequality reduction comparing different parts of the income distribution. Section 4 compares 
relative mobility of different incomes groups using transition matrices. Section 5 assesses 
absolute mobility and gives the estimates of relative contribution of different income groups to 
the overall mobility. Section 6 attempts to link changes in inequality with relative mobility and 
pro-poor growth. Section 7 sheds some light on the determinants of income mobility. It identifies 
socio-demographic household types and kinds of income which contribute the most to the overall 
mobility. Finally, Section 8 provides a summary and conclusion.  
 
2. DATA, MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data description 
The data used in this project come from the 2000-2005 waves of the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS is a unique panel survey of Russian households based 
on the national probability sample. It has been previously used by a number of researchers to 
analyze income mobility, poverty dynamics and consumption smoothing by Russian households. 
In 2000-2005 the survey was held in each year of the period. Following a long tradition of 
mobility studies, we restrict the sample to the households interviewed and reported non-missing 
incomes in all six waves. This yields a sample of 2317 households for incomes and 2716 
households for expenditures.  
As any panel survey, the RLMS suffers from sample attrition. Table 1 presents basic 
descriptive statistics of the households and individuals for the balanced panel and cross-sections. 
Attrition rate is actually high. However, the panel has been significantly replenished in 2001 to 
restore the sample for Moscow and St. Petersburg and for technical reasons the RLMS team had 
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to replace one of the primary sample units. Thus, the real drop-out rate is not that high. Mu 
(2006) analyzing sample attrition in the RLMS reports that those who stayed in the panel over 
1994-2003 were, on average, poorer and larger with more children and more senior members. 
Those leaving the panel were more likely to have a more educated household head and lived in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. His tests show that attrition was non-random in a sense that 
households with higher incomes and more resources were leaving the sample. In this case the 
right tail of income distribution is likely to be underestimated causing potential biases in 
mobility measures. However, correction for attrition in his paper on consumption smoothing had 
no qualitative effect on the results.  
Comparing of households characteristics for the balanced panel and separate cross-sections 
shows that our balanced panel heavily under-represents households from Moscow and St. 
Petersburg. Households in the balanced panel are of larger size in 2000 but become smaller by 
the end of the period. The average number of children per household is declining over time in a 
greater speed for the balanced panel than for cross-sections. Both regularities suggest that 
attrition may not be random. However, ageing can be another explanation for this discrepancy – 
newly formed households consisting of young people with kids do not enter the balanced panel. 
In what concerns incomes households in the balanced panel tend to report lower incomes but we 
do not find any significant deviation between the two samples in the dynamics of average 
incomes. In all years of the period all income measures for the balanced panel were at a level of 
about 90% of corresponding measures in cross-sections (Table 2). Therefore, attrition in fact 
may not be a big problem and since it is hard to estimate the consequences of sample attrition we 
do not attempt to account for this problem.  
Construction of welfare aggregates 
The main variable of interest in our research is per adult equivalent income computed as 
follows: 
q
ChildrenAdults NN
IncomeHousehouldY
)*)1(*1(
_
βα +−+=     (1) 
where Y refers to per adult equivalent income. Incomes are corrected for difference in the size 
and composition of the household applying equivalence scales: α and β refer to the weights of 
household members; q is the parameter of economies of scale.  
Equivalence scales are the way to make comparable consumption aggregates of households 
with different demographic composition. They account for the fact that typically children 
consume less than adults and that some services and goods can be shared in consumption. 
Unfortunately, there are no generally accepted methods for calculating equivalence scales. Most 
commonly the effects of differences in consumption within households and economies of scale 
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are estimated using the methodology based on the Engel model. Parameter estimates are 
obtained from the regression of the share of food expenditures on the logarithm of per capita 
household income, the size of household and its demographic composition. This approach has 
been heavily criticized in (Deaton, 1997). Deaton and Zaidi (1999) argue that making relatively 
ad hoc corrections can do better job. In their particular example they suggest setting weights for 
all adults in the household at unity. Parameters β and q should depend on the level of economic 
development of a country. Since most of the literature shows that children are relatively more 
expensive in industrialized countries than in poor agrarian countries, β can be set close to unity 
for the US and Europe and about 0.3 for the poorest countries. On the contrary, since in the 
poorest countries most of the income is spent on food which is private consumption, the value of 
q must be relatively high (close to 1). In industrialized countries with high economies of scale q 
must be lower (about 0.75 or even 0.5).  
Previous studies applied different equivalence scales often basing on arbitrary assumptions. 
Bogomolova and Topilina (1999) apply the OECD equivalence scale which weights the head of 
the household at 1 with each additional adult given the weight of 0.7 and each child – the weight 
of 0.5. Jovanovich (2001) and Luttmer (2000) do not correct for differences in household 
composition but their measures for the household size with q=0.75. For subjective measures of 
income Lokshin and Ravallion (1998) apply q as low as 0.4. Spryskov (2003) employs the Engel 
curve methodology for the pooled RLMS dataset for 1994-2000. He finds no economies of scale 
(q=1), but recommends applying low weights to children (0.62-0.67 of consumption of a 
working age male) and old males (0.53) and higher weights to working age females (1.2). The 
calculations of the RLMS team also suggest relatively modest economies of scale in Russian 
households (Popkin et al, 1995). Their equivalence scale is roughly equivalent to applying q=0.8. 
In this paper for sensitivity checks we use three equivalence scales: the OECD scale, q=1 and 
q=0.75. 
Information on incomes is taken mainly from the “Incomes” section of the RLMS 
household questionnaire with cross-checks from the individual questionnaires for wages, 
pensions, unemployment benefits and reported total personal incomes. All measures refer to 
incomes received during last 30 days. Of course, an annual income definition would be superior 
on the grounds that a longer period measure is less likely to reflect transitory and seasonal 
variations. In the absence of annual income data, we are forced to assume that income status 
round about the time of interview is a proxy for annual income status. Besides, monthly data also 
have their particular advantages. Household composition is measured at the time of the 
interview. Thus with monthly data the numerator and denominator elements in (1) are more 
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likely to be consistent with each other (both depend on household composition which may 
change over the year). 
To check for sensitivity we use several income measures. More specifically, for each 
individual we first take the sum of reported wages from all jobs (including in-kind payments), 
pensions and unemployment benefits. After that we compare this constructed measure of 
personal incomes with reported total personal incomes and take a high of the two income 
indicators as a measure of total personal incomes (if both measures are available). Then we sum 
total personal incomes for all household members within each household which produces what 
we call a measure of household incomes based on individual incomes.  
The second measure is taken from direct question about total monetary income of the 
household received during last 30 days. We call it the reported household incomes. The third 
income aggregate is calculated summarizing the incomes from various sources reported by the 
household. This measure includes wages, in-kind payments, pensions, stipends, subsidies for 
housing and fuel, transfers from the government, other households and various private donations. 
We also include some incomes from financial operations such as investment and interest 
payments received as well as incomes from renting out one’s assets. However, we exclude 
incomes from borrowing, receiving debt repayments, selling securities, foreign exchange and 
other ‘lumpy’ incomes. We also exclude incomes from selling home-produced goods because the 
RLMS lacks adequate information on production costs.  
As the last step we compare all three income measures and for each household take a high 
of them as a measure of total household incomes assuming that households tend to underreport 
their incomes. This measure is used as the basic income aggregate in this study. All other 
measures are employed mostly for sensitivity checks. 
Construction of expenditure aggregate is not straightforward. We follow the guidelines in 
Deaton and Zaidi (1999) and employ the “Expenditures” section of the RLMS household 
questionnaire. All expenditures are converted to monthly reference period. 
In principle, consumption can be aggregated into four main classes: (i) food items, (ii) 
nonfood items, (iii) consumer durables, and (iv) housing. For food consumption sub-aggregate 
the major difficulties are with home produced goods. In “Expenditure” section people are asked 
in great detail about their purchases of various food items during last 7 days. In the “Agriculture” 
section they are asked about the quantities home-produced goods during 12 months. The 
problem here is how to impute the prices for home produced goods. As the best approximation 
we construct prices from the data for other households and use the median price paid by other 
households in the same locality. However, these pries are likely to overestimate real 
expenditures. First of all, market prices include transportation and trading costs and, thus, are 
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higher than “farm-gate” prices. Seond, home-produced food items consumed by the household 
may not be comparable in quality to items traded in the market place. 
For non-food items the reference period in the RLMS is either 30 days or 3 months. We 
exclude “lumpy” expenditures such as payments for ritual services. The “Expenditures” section 
also allows collecting health and education expenditures, we simply add them to the total.  
According to Deaton and Zaidi (1999), durables should be included into consumption 
aggregate. The authors propose a simple method how to measure the consumption of durables as 
the value of services that the household receives from their possession over the relevant time 
period. We would be glad to follow these recommendations, but the RLMS data does not contain 
information concerning the age and value and/or replacement value of durables that a household 
possesses. Households were only asked whether they bought any durables in the last 3 months 
and for what price. Even so, groups, by which durables are divided in this question, are mixed. 
Jovanovic (2001) and Spryskov (2003) do not include them expenditures on durables into 
consumption aggregate, and we follow their practice.2
Housing is the most problematic of all the consumption sub-aggregates. As for other 
consumer durables what really matters is the value of services that the household receives from 
living in the dwelling. For those who rent dwellings the value of services is equal to the amount 
of rent they pay. For those who own the dwelling or get the dwelling free of charge or at 
subsidized prices one has to impute rents. Imputing rents can be a troublesome exercise in a 
country where rental markets are extremely thin. Unfortunately, in the RLMS only 6% of 
household reported renting their dwellings in 2000-2005. In our work we do not take into 
account housing services when calculating expenditure aggregates.3  The calculation of another 
part of housing expenditures - expenditures on housing utilities – using RLMS data is 
straightforward.  
When calculating expenditure aggregates we imputed the amount of a purchase if a 
household purchased an item, but the information on its amount was missing. Taking such 
missings equal to zeros clearly leads to the underestimation of expenditures. Imputations were 
made for each expenditure item. We imputed zeros in place of missings only if a household did 
not purchase an item. Imputed amounts were calculated on the base of regressions estimated by 
simple OLS on the sample of households, which purchased corresponding items. The dependent 
variable was an amount of purchase. Independent variables were status of location (4 categories), 
interaction of year and region, the size of household (5 categories), the number of children under 
                                                 
2 We present inequality and mobility measures with and without expenditures on durables and house construction 
and refurbishment. 
3 According to Gorodnichenko et al., (2008), housing services may have an equalizing effect on consumption 
distribution, so we should bear in mind that omitting them may increase expenditure inequality  
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15 (4 categories) and the number of adults elder than 60 (4 categories). For the balanced panel 
the imputation led to increase in the number of observations by a factor of 5, rise in expenditures 
aggregates and inequality measures by about 20% and 10% respectively. At the same time the 
structure of expenditures across deciles did not change significantly. 
All income and expenditure measures are deflated by annual regional consumer price 
deflators indexed to 100 at October 2000. However, we do not correct for inflation within rounds 
because inflation was relatively low in 2000-2005. Zero incomes are treated as erroneous 
responses. Cowell and Schluter (1998) demonstrate that the majority of mobility indicators are 
very sensitive to the presence of data contamination. Thus, to avoid disturbances caused by 
outliers we trimmed the sample deleting 0.25% records at the bottom and the top of the 
distribution for each of income and expenditure measures. For certain decompositions we need 
to determine a head of each household. Unfortunately, in the RLMS respondents are not asked 
about personal ownership or tenancy of dwellings. Neither are they asked a direct question about 
who is the head of the household. We use a very straight-forward procedure in defining the sex 
of household heads. A household is deemed to be headed by a male if it has one or more 
working-age males. If there no working age males in a household but there are working age 
females the household is treated as headed by a female. In households with no working age 
members, a male elderly is treated as a head of a household. If none, a household is treated as 
being headed by a female. 
 
Basic descriptive statistics on incomes, expenditures and cross-sectional inequality 
Before turning to the analysis of income dynamics, we provide some basic descriptive 
statistics for incomes and expenditures (Table I.24). Our calculations demonstrate spectacular 
rise in real household incomes. From 2000 to 2005 real incomes increased on average by 85-
90%. All income aggregates demonstrate similar trends with incomes rising in all years of the 
period. Income growth was especially rapid in 2001 when real incomes increased on average by 
25%. Over the period income growth was larger in the low end of the distribution (see Figure 1).  
Real expenditures exhibit a qualitatively similar dynamis. Figure 2 presents the evolution 
of average per adult equivalent incomes and expenditures using q=0.75. As comes from the 
graph expenditure averages have a flatter path compared to incomes. Between 2000 and 2005 
expenditures increased on average only by 30-35%. Expenditures were above incomes in the 
initial year of the period, but due to faster growth incomes caught up expenditures by 2004 and 
even exceeded them in 2005.  
                                                 
4 Tables marked with letter I refer to incomes. Tables marked with letter E refer to expenditures. 
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Table I.2 compares the means of various income aggregates for three different equivalence 
scales. Per adult equivalent incomes were calculated on the basis of total household incomes. By 
construction the latter measure is on average larger than any other income aggregate. Thus 
justifiable comparisons in the table are either among mean per capita incomes based on different 
income aggregates or among measures of equivalent incomes. Reported household incomes 
generally should be larger than measures based on summation of different types of income. This 
is because reported household incomes may include some incomes which were excluded from 
summation procedure such as incomes from selling home-produced goods, incomes from 
financial operations, etc. However probably due to recall or measurement errors it is not true for 
2002-2003 (but the difference is small). In all years household incomes based on individual 
incomes are on average lower than the income measures calculated from the household 
questionnaire. It is an expected result because some incomes such as housing subsidies cannot be 
attributed to a single household member and are only found in the household questionnaire. 
Comparing equivalence scales we see that the scale, which only accounts for economies of 
scale (q=0.75), produces the largest mean. However, mean equivalent incomes based on the 
OECD-type equivalence scale are only slightly lower. Mere division of total incomes by the 
household size gives the lowest mean. Dynamics of all three measures of equivalent income are 
very similar because the household structures have not changed much over the six-year period. 
Table E.2 shows that similar relationship between different equivalence scales holds for real 
expenditures as well.  
Table 3 presents inequality measures based on different income and expenditure 
aggregates. We report three measures of inequality which are particularly sensitive to income 
variation in different parts of the distribution. Mean log deviation which is also called 
generalized entropy measure with α=0 – GE(0) – more heavily weights differences in incomes in 
the low end of the distribution. The Gini coefficient is more sensitive to variation in the middle 
of the distribution. Generalized entropy measure with α=2 – GE(2) – which is equal to a half of 
the coefficient of variation squared gives more weight to income differences at the top of the 
distribution.  
All income inequality measures agree on the trend of declining dispersion of monetary 
incomes over the period. For incomes both Gini and GE(2) were about 7-10% lower in the 2005 
than in 2000. The GE(0) coefficient dropped by 16% over the period. Among income aggregates 
inequality is generally larger for reported incomes especially at the top of the distribution 
probably reflecting measurement errors. Inequality also appears to be large when measured on 
the basis of household incomes summed from individual questionnaires. High dispersion of this 
income aggregate may be due to the fact some of the household members skipped filling 
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individual questionnaires. Thus, this indicator may not be a reliable measure of household 
incomes. On the other hand, income aggregate based on the sum of components of household 
incomes is likely to understate the true level of inequality for the upper half of the distribution 
and overstate it for the bottom of the distribution if we have been too restrictive in selecting the 
types of income to include in this income aggregate. Total household incomes indicator (which 
was constructed as a high of all income measures available for each household) appears to 
behave in a more balanced and credible manner. It shows less cross-sectional variability of 
incomes at both tails of the distribution while for the middle of the distribution it sufficiently 
well conforms to other income aggregates. Equivalence scales somewhat alter the standing of 
large households relative to small households, or households with large numbers of children 
relative to those with none, but this has only minor effect on inequality measures. 
Concerning expenditures, as we expected, the exclusion of lumpy expenditures from 
expenditures aggregates results in the lower levels of expenditure inequality. Inequality in 
expenditures hardly changed over the period for the middle of the distribution but demonstrated 
moves in different directions at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. Inequality declined 
for a broad definition of expenditures which includes durables and house renovation, but 
increased for non-durable consumption. Within the period there is no clear trend in expenditure 
inequality. All measures both with and without durables indicate that inequality decreased in 
2001-2003, but it rose afterwards (Figure 3). It is worth noting that the level of income inequality 
was higher than the level of non-durable expenditure inequality for most of the period. However, 
by 2005 their levels became similar as a result of a lower decline in expenditure inequality.  
 
3. Mobility and long-term inequality  
High cross-sectional inequality can be partly offset by mobility. If there is a lot of churning 
in the distribution as households move relative to one another, incomes averaged over longer 
time periods will be much more equally distributed than incomes from any single year. 
Similarly, rising inequality could be partly offset by rising mobility. Shorrocks (Shorrocks, 1978) 
proposed a so-called rigidity index to measure the extent to which relative mobility reduces 
longer-run inequality. This index makes a connection between cross-sectional inequality and 
permanent inequality. 
Shorrocks rigidity index is defined as the ratio of some inequality index of the total income 
in the two periods to the weighted average of the same inequality index in each period:  
)/()( yxyyxx
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where I refers to the inequality index, x+y to the sum of incomes in the two periods, µx and µy to 
the mean incomes in the first and the second period. The Gini coefficient is commonly used in 
calculating Shorrocks index. Following Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) we will also use inequality 
indices from the GE(α) family which are sensitive (depending on α) to changes in different parts 
of the distribution. 
The value of Shorrocks rigidity index cannot be greater than unity since inequality in 
annual incomes is always greater than inequality in total incomes for a longer time period. A 
value of 1 means no mobility at all suggesting that even in the long run individuals do not 
change their relative ranks in the income distribution. Shorrocks index decreases (albeit at 
diminishing rate) as duration of the underlying time period grows. This regularity reflects the 
fact that chances for income mobility are higher in the long run. Instead of Shorrocks rigidity 
index we employ a measure of (1-R) which is easy to interpret. It is often referred to as 
Shorrocks mobility index. In percentage terms it shows a percentage reduction in income 
inequality when incomes are averaged over longer periods.  
Of course, these calculations provide a tentative and incomplete measure of income 
mobility. On the one hand, because the available data cover only six years, the full equalizing 
effect of mobility over the life-cycle is not captured. It is understated as only a modest share of 
life-cycle related differences in incomes “averages out” in such a short period. In another sense 
the equalizing effects of mobility are overstated. On the other hand, averaging household 
incomes over an extended period assumes that households are able to maintain a living standard 
based on a complete or near-complete smoothing of their consumption, no matter how volatile 
their income paths may be. Because it assumes that a stable income path provides the same 
welfare as a widely and unpredictably fluctuating path with the same average income, it is clear 
that Shorrocks mobility index gives an upper-bound estimate of how mobility reduces inequality. 
It is not possible to assess the quantitative importance of these factors and we can’t know to what 
extent they offset each other.  
In assessing mobility one has to remember that mobility is not necessarily a good thing that 
reduces differences in living standards, rather it is a double-edged sword. Mobility sometimes 
takes the form of large volatility in real incomes when significant shares of population 
experience absolute declines or large increases in real incomes. This can result economic 
insecurity.  
The estimates of Shorrocks mobility index for one-year sub-periods are shown in Tables I.4 
and E.4. In the last column mobility is measured over longer time period, but even for longer 
periods we match samples for the initial and the final years and ignore what has happened 
between two time points. In fact, income inequality falls if we sum incomes for two time periods. 
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Even if we take two consecutive years, inequality is reduced by 8-25%. Over longer time period 
the equalizing effect normally increases but the reduction associated with expanding of the time 
horizon is much smaller than in the first year. It is the case because most of transitory 
movements in monthly incomes fade out in the course of a single year.  
Another important finding is that the choice of inequality index matters. Mobility does not 
operate equally at all points of the distribution. For all years and income aggregates the Gini 
coefficient indicates much weaker reduction in inequality than two other indices. It appears, 
therefore, that households in the middle of the distribution tend to have relatively stable incomes 
and, hence, more persistent income differences. Mobility smoothes out income differences 
mostly in the tails of the distribution. This result is partly predictable because of monthly 
reference period.  
The peak of mobility was observed in 2001 and 2002, after that mobility slows. For 2005 
there are some signs of recovery in mobility rates. Mobility is generally higher for those 
aggregates that less equally distributed, probably, due to larger contribution of transitory 
incomes and measurement errors. Again the results are not very sensitive to the choice of 
equivalence scale. Mobility is roughly of the same magnitude for incomes and non-durable 
expenditures but it is slightly more stable for expenditures (Figure 4). In a line with what would 
be expected, when we include durable expenditures mobility shows almost no change for GE(0), 
increases slightly for the Gini coefficient and rises considerably for GE(2). This finding reflects 
the fact that non-durable expenditures are more stable than total expenditures due to infrequency 
of durables purchases. The difference between the two grows with the level of income and, 
hence, differences are larger for those measures which are more sensitive to expenditure 
differences in the upper tail of distribution. 
Up to this point we ignored what happened between the beginning and the end of time 
horizon. Figure 5 shows how mobility changes for incomes and expenditures cumulated over 
various time horizons. To draw this picture we used a sub-sample of individuals who participated 
in all six waves of the survey. Mobility is calculated on the basis per adult equivalent incomes 
and expenditures with q=0.75. The horizontal axis R=0 represents a completely immobile 
structure. If the mobility curves show a sharp initial jump, but then remain more or less 
horizontal, the structure suggests large transitory variations in incomes. Structures are considered 
more egalitarian if the initial rise is not very sharp, but increase in R continues as the time 
horizon is extended. The mobility profiles depicted in Figure 5 indicate that the initial rise is 
high, but it levels out as we add additional periods. This means that transitory variation in 
incomes and expenditures is extremely high. However, there is no indication that mobility curves 
flatten out so that the full equalizing effect of mobility is exhausted within the first six years. For 
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longer periods we are likely to have even larger reductions in inequality due to mobility because 
relatively little of the life-cycle income differences balances out in such a short period. 
Due to mobility, over six-year period inequality declined by almost 40-50% at the top, by 
35-40% at the bottom and by 16-20% in the middle of the distribution (here we give the range of 
estimates from different welfare aggregates). This means that much of poverty in Russia is only 
transitory and much of richness is very unstable. Another conclusion is that inequality is more 
persistent in the low end than in the top the distribution. Note that mobility profiles for incomes 
and expenditures are almost identical for Gini and GE(0), but for GE(2) there is a sizable 
difference unless the accounting period is extended to six years. This result is consistent the idea 
that richer individuals have more opportunities to smooth their consumption. High-income 
people do not spend all their incomes but save part of their incomes for future periods. For lower 
income groups who lack savings and are affected by borrowing constraints incomes and 
expenditures are highly correlated and mobility measures show more similarity for both 
indicators. 
Comparing the evidence for 2000-2005 with Jovanovic’s (2000) estimates for 1994-1998, 
it appears that mobility has declined (albeit by a small amount) at the bottom and at the middle 
of the distribution (Table 6)5. This happened mostly due to the moderation of transitory shocks 
since one-year mobility measures have declined most substantially. 
Next we assess Russian mobility rates in the international perspective (Table 6). In all 
countries listed in the table mobility leads to significantly lower reductions in inequality no 
matter what inequality indicator is chosen. According to Gangl (2005), only Italy, Denmark, 
Netherlands and Greece approaches the lower bound of our mobility estimates for Russia. 
Unfortunately, we lack transition countries among the comparators in Table 6. The only 
developing country in the table is South Africa with inequality persistence only slightly less than 
in developed countries.  
The difference between Russia and other countries is hard to explain because Shorrocks 
mobility indices tend to be pretty similar for countries with very different levels of inequality. 
The answer may be related to higher inflation rates in Russia. Studying income mobility in 
Argentina, Beccaria and Groisman (2008) report that equalizing effect of mobility was 
significantly lower during the periods of low inflation and increased with rise of inflation. 
Transition-specific factors could be another driving force of mobility. Khor and Pencavel (2006) 
study mobility of labor incomes in urban China in the early 1990s and find that for this indicator 
relative mobility was higher in China than in the USA or other high-income countries. The 
                                                 
5 However, Jovanovic (2000) does his calculations for households (not for individuals as we do). Therefore, our 
results are not strictly comparable. 
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observed cross-national differences in mobility may reflect differences in institutions and access 
to credit. Incomes of individuals, who experience temporary hardship, would be more variable in 
a country with weak social safety net and limited access to credit. Previous studies have shown 
that in Russia there are severe constraints on the availability of resources that could help to 
smooth incomes and consumption as access to credit is limited and public social safety net is 
ineffective. Specificities of the survey design namely monthly reference period for incomes, 
sample attrition and measurement errors could also contribute to upward bias in Russian mobility 
rates. 
 
4. Transition matrices 
The calculations of Shorrocks indices allowed all movements in incomes to affect mobility. 
This mobility measure does not, however, reveal who is moving where in the distribution. In this 
subsection we address this by examining transitions between the deciles of the income 
distribution. More specifically, we construct transition matrices. Each cell of transition matrix is 
the probability pij of transferring from decile i (Di) to decile j (Aj)6 in period between time 
periods t and t+k. We also compute and discuss various summary indicators of relative income 
mobility based on transition matrices. Among these mobility measures we distinguish the 
immobility ratio (called immobility ratio-1 in this paper) which is defined as the average 
percentage of people staying in the same decile of the distribution and the average absolute jump 
which measures the amplitude of the movements – i.e. the number of deciles the typical 
individual “jumps over” between two time periods. All mobility measures can be compared with 
the “perfect mobility” case, when the probability of being in each decile is independent of the 
starting point. We also differentiate between upward and downward movements and calculate 
proportions of those moving up and down. Our data allows computing mobility indices for the 
six-year interval (2000-2005) and then turn to short-term (year-to-year) transitions. Since 
mobility has proven to be very similar for various income and expenditure aggregates, hereafter 
we confine ourselves to per adult equivalent measures with q=0.75 and pay more attention to 
comparison of mobility patterns between incomes and non-durable expenditures. 
Tables I.7 and E.7 describe mobility over the whole period 2000-2005. Both incomes and 
expenditures demonstrate high mobility in Russia, which is indicated by large numbers off the 
main diagonal. On average, just 15-17% stayed in the same decile by the end of the six-year 
period while more than 80% experienced some changes in their relative positions. Incomes 
register less mobility than expenditures. Probability of changing the state is lower for the 
extreme deciles than for the middle deciles. The higher degree of immobility observed in the 
                                                 
6 Letters D and A abbreviate departure and arrival.  
 19
bottom and top deciles relative to the middle deciles is not surprising since the bottom tenth have 
no where to go but to move up, and the top tenth have no where to go but to move down.  
Large part of mobility consists of moves to adjacent deciles and contains purely exchange 
mobility. Thus, we recalculated the immobility ratio (see immobility ratio-2) to include the band 
given by the main diagonal of the transition matrix and the adjacent elements. Nonetheless, 40-
45% of individuals remained on or close to the diagonal. However, mobility is still very high – at 
least 55-60% of individuals experienced significant – in excess of 10 percentage points – move 
in their relative positions. 
For expenditures the highest staying probability is at the very top decile. This indicates that 
individuals at very top of the distribution are more likely to stay there than the individuals at the 
lower end of the distribution. However, this does not hold for incomes. For incomes the 
probability of staying in the very bottom of the distribution is higher that the probability of 
preserving a high-income position. This discrepancy may be due to differences in accounting 
home-produced goods which are especially important for the poorest deciles. Our income 
measure does not include incomes from subsistence agricultural activities while our expenditure 
measure includes monetary equivalents of consumption of home-produced goods. About 30% in 
of those in the lowest income decile in 2000 were also in the lowest income decile in 2005 
suggesting that they may be trapped in poverty. Expenditures measure suggests less degree of 
extreme poverty persistence: about 21% of those in the lowest decile in 2000 were also in the 
lowest decile in 2005. In other words, 70-80% of the most poor managed to escape extreme 
poverty in the course of the six-year period. A quarter of them moved to the next-poorest decile, 
but about 30% jumped into the upper half of the distribution. If we define poverty as being in the 
poorest fifth, then 44% (35% for expenditures) of those in the lowest income quintile were still 
there six years later and 65% (for both incomes and expenditures) are either in the poorest or 
next-poorest quintile. Taking these figures together they suggest that around one half of low 
income is in some sense transient, but another half is not. 
There is a moderate asymmetry in upward and downward movements. However, income 
and expenditures disagree on the direction of such asymmetry. According to our income 
measure, we find that 40.9% – independently from the magnitude of the jump – were better off at 
the end of the period. Conversely, when downward mobility is considered, 41.7% of individuals 
were worse off in terms of their relative standing. Considering expenditures we find that the 
percentage of upward movers was higher than the percentage of downward movers: 43.5% of 
individuals experienced an upward jump in the income hierarchy over the period, compared to 
41.6% who moved down in the distribution. All these figures have to be compared with 45% 
under perfect mobility leading to a conclusion of very high mobility in Russia. 
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Besides the frequency and the direction of movements, it is interesting to investigate the 
amplitude of the jumps. Over the period, the average magnitude of a jump for a typical 
individual is equal to 2.26-2.47, which corresponds to a move of about a quartile in the 
distribution. In the perfect mobility case the jump is equal to 3.3 deciles. Expenditures 
demonstrate higher incidence of large upward (more than 2 deciles up) jumps and lower 
incidence of large downward (more than 2 deciles down) jumps.  
Table 8 tracks short-term mobility measures inside the period of analysis. About 75-80% of 
individuals change their relative positions in the distribution each year with mobility being 
higher for expenditures. Over one half of the poorest decile is moving up the income distribution 
each year. About a half of the richest decile is moving down the income ladder each year. The 
time trend is similar to one revealed by Shorrocks indices. Both the frequency of movements and 
the average magnitude of the jump were larger in 2001 and 2002. In the international perspective 
Russia stands out to have the lowest immobility rates among the countries presented in Figure 6. 
In most developed countries the immobility ratio-1 is in the range of 35-50% compared to 20-
25% in the RLMS. 
 
5. Absolute mobility 
The analysis of income mobility across deciles of the income distribution undertaken in the 
previous sub-section is an analysis of movement across income thresholds. The degree to which 
these thresholds are exceeded or not exceeded is neglected. Moreover, the movement across 
income deciles describes relative movement and is consistent with the real income of all people 
falling or rising. Therefore, in order to show a comprehensive picture of income mobility, we 
should measure not only the relative mobility but also the absolute mobility. 
We employ the index proposed by Fields and Ok (1999), which is formulated as follows, 
∑
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where n is the number of individuals, x refers to the base year income and y is the final year 
income. This index is the aggregate of the change in each individual’s income. It can be used for 
international comparisons as it can be interpreted as the mean percentage income changes 
between these two years. 
One important feature of (3) is that total mobility is decomposable into two sources, one 
that reflects income changes due to economic growth and the other that reflects income changes 
due to transfer of income among individuals, holding the mean constant. In a growing economy, 
 21
where , with L (losers) individuals who lost their incomes over time (∑∑
==
≥
n
i
i
n
i
i xy
11
yxLi >∈ : ), 
equation (3) can be broken down into two components7: 
∑∑
∈=
−+−=+=
Li
ii
n
i
iiTG yxn
xy
n
MMyxm )log(log2)log(log1),(
1
  (4) 
Table 9 provides the estimates of Fields-Ok mobility index, M, and the dual components 
(MG and MT) for the entire period 2000-2005 and for one-year sub-periods. Yearly indices show 
that the peak of absolute mobility was observed in the first years of the period and it was steadily 
declining in later years. In terms of underlying sources, a massive portion of income mobility 
was accounted for by people moving up or down within the income distribution from one year to 
another (i.e. transfers of income). Income growth was generally less important in determining 
one-year mobility. For incomes this component contributed to about 20-30% of total income 
changes and only in 2000-2001 the share of the growth component exceeded 40%. The dynamics 
of the growth component is closely related to average rates of income growth. Figure 7 illustrates 
this point. The relative contribution of growth is higher in the periods of higher income growth. 
When the observed time period is extended to six years, mobility increases so as the contribution 
of economic growth. This finding is consistent with most other papers using Fields-Ok mobility 
index which also report that the contribution of economic growth to income mobility is higher in 
the longer term. This picture is consistent with the view that improvements in macroeconomic 
situation have raised incomes of most individuals as ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’.  
The pattern of absolute mobility appears to be dependent on the welfare aggregate chosen. 
For expenditures the picture is quite different from that for incomes. Average expenditures have 
not grown as much as incomes did which is reflected in lower values of Fields-Ok mobility 
index for most of one-year sub-periods and for the whole period. However, there is a significant 
difference in the relative contributions of the growth and transfer components between incomes 
and expenditures. Expenditures suggest much higher importance of transfers, i.e. the degree to 
which the income growth of the winners (those whose incomes increased over the period) offsets 
the income losses by the losers. The contribution of growth component is equal to 38% for the 
whole period. For one-year sub-periods it varies from 2% to 20%. In fact, closer inspection of 
the sample demonstrates that the fraction of those who experienced declines in real incomes 
between 2000 and 2005 is significantly higher in our expenditures data than in our incomes data 
(35% vs 14%). This may be caused by the imputation procedure employed (see Section 2). 
Another possible explanation is that some kinds of expenditures which are normally treated as 
non-durable and quite regular (such as clothing) in fact require savings from low-income 
                                                 
7 For derivation see Fields and Ok (1999). 
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households. They can bring additional longitudinal variability to the expenditure measure. In any 
case estimates based on income aggregates that are free of imputation interventions seem to be 
more reliable and should be used for international comparisons. 
Table 10 compares Russian Fields-Ok mobility indices with those for other countries. 
Among the listed countries only China demonstrates similar mobility rates while other countries 
lag behind. The contribution of economic growth is also larger in Russia. In other countries 
economic growth explains 0-40% of absolute mobility over five-year periods compared to 83% 
in Russia (for the six-year period). However, neither of these countries experienced such high 
rates of economic growth in the period under consideration. Figure 8 demonstrates that over time 
the rates of absolute mobility were converging to the lower levels observed in developed 
countries. 
Our next question is who and to what extent benefits from economic growth. We wonder 
whether income growth was pro-poor or pro-rich and what income group contributed the most to 
income mobility. Cross-sectional evidence suggests that inequality declined to some extent over 
the period. Incomes at the bottom of the distribution were growing faster than at top. In our 
sample average incomes of the lowest quintile increased by a factor of 2.2 between 2000 and 
2005 while those of the highest quintile increased by a factor of 1.8. These estimates suggest that 
income growth has favored the poor. However, these estimates are not very informative because 
they refer to groups of individuals rather than to individuals themselves. Composition of both 
extreme income groups substantially changed over time (see transition matrices in the previous 
section). People in the lowest income category in 2005 are not the same individuals as were in it 
in 2000. Relatively few of those in the highest income category in 2000 remained there by 2005. 
Longitudinal data allows us to track the same individuals.  
Fields and Ok (1999) proposed a simple decomposition technique that considers the 
aggregate income variations as a weighted average of the specific movements of different 
population sub-groups. The decomposition builds upon the Fields-Ok mobility index. It can be 
used to break down the aggregate income movement m(x,y) by income groups: 
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where J is the number of groups, nj is the number of people in group j, x and y are incomes in the 
initial and the final year of the period, respectively.  
Columns (1)-(3) of Table I.11 provide a summary of income dynamics for the whole 
sample and at different points of the distribution. From 2000 to 2005 absolute incomes rose by 
84%. Mobility was higher for lower deciles. On average, those at the lower tail of the income 
distribution in 2000 experienced larger income changes by 2005 than those who started at the 
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upper tail of the income distribution. Each decile has a certain fraction of individuals who 
experienced falls in real income over the period. The fraction of losers is almost negligible in the 
lowest decile, but it grows monotonically along the income scale and reaches 54.4% in the 
highest decile. Low fraction of losers in the bottom half of the distribution together with high 
values of Fields-Ok mobility index suggests that income growth over the period is likely to be 
pro-poor.  
It is important to note that estimates shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table I.11 are likely to 
overstate real income increases at the low end of the distribution and understate them at the 
upper tail of the distribution. The decile position in 2000 could be affected by measurement 
errors or transitory shocks that place some people above their permanent income and other 
people below their permanent income. Those temporarily below their steady-state income in 
2000 will tend to experience a larger increase in their income from 2000 to 2005 while those 
temporarily above their steady-state income in 2000 will tend to experience a smaller increase in 
their income from 2000 to 2005.  
The relevance of these considerations is suggested by the relationship shown in columns 
(4)-(6) of Table I.11, which relate income growth not to initial income but to final income. 
Income gains appear to be the largest to those who happened to be at the top of the income 
distribution in 2005. Conversely, those at the bottom of the distribution in 2005 are those who 
experienced the lowest real income growth or even income losses over the period. Again this is 
consistent with a permanent-transitory income explanation: those in 2005 temporarily below 
their steady-state income will tend to have a smaller increase in their income from 2000 to 2005, 
while those in 2005 temporarily above their steady-state income will record a larger increase in 
their income over the period.  
The conclusion is that the relationship between incomes and changes in incomes is strongly 
affected by measurement errors and transitory shocks to incomes. We are in a risk to heavily 
over-exaggerate income growth at the bottom of the distribution. The only way to solve this 
puzzle is to relate changes in incomes to some measure of permanent income. For each 
individual we averaged equivalent incomes longitudinally over all six years to obtain a measure 
of permanent incomes. Next we ordered permanent incomes by deciles and computed average 
absolute changes in log incomes between 2000 and 2005. The result is presented in columns (7)-
(9) of Table I.11. These results indicate that lower decile groups had only slightly larger relative 
contributions to overall mobility while incidence of income losses was more equally distributed 
across the deciles of the distribution. 
Changes in log incomes (not absolute values) are depicted in Figure 9A. The blue line 
relates changes in log-incomes to the rank of individual in the permanent income distribution. 
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The red line relates changes in log-incomes to the rank of individual in initial (2000) income 
distribution. It is a graphical version of column (1) of Table I.11 for log incomes. This line 
demonstrates substantial catching up by the poorest individuals. Note that the income growth of 
those who were in the lowest decile in 2000 is well above the increase registered for the group of 
poor (160% vs 120%). Those initially in the top decile of distribution on average experienced a 
loss in their incomes. This is to be compared with the income growth of 80% for the top decile as 
a group. Graphical analogue of column (4) for log incomes is given by the green line. Those the 
poorest in 2005 had their incomes hardly changed between 2000 and 2005 while incomes of 
those at the top of the distribution in 2005 have increased by a factor of 2.4 since 2000. It relates 
changes in log-incomes to the rank of individual in the final (2005) income distribution. The 
solid line is nearly flat suggesting no relationship between permanent income percentile and 
income growth.  
However, there may be a problem with this definition of permanent incomes during the 
period of rapid income growth. Longitudinal averaging puts equal weights to incomes in all six 
years. If income growth is fast then the value of permanent incomes would be largely driven by 
incomes in the late years of the period. Therefore, we perform two other sensitivity checks to test 
our tentative conclusion about no relationship between position in the income distribution and 
the rate of income growth.  
First, we look at the duration of poverty and richness. Table 12 presents frequencies for 
incidence of poverty and richness measured in number of years in the bottom and the top 
quintile, respectively. It comes from the table that 53.2% of individuals in the panel never 
experienced poverty while 50.6% of individuals in the panel never found themselves in the top 
quintile. We are interested in individuals who were poor or rich for only one year: 16.4% of 
individuals were poor for only one year and 19.5% were rich for only one year. We speculate 
that these experiences are most likely to result from measurement errors or from some transitory 
fortunes or misfortunes. We excluded these individuals from the sample and redraw the graph for 
the remainder of the sample (Figure 9B). This graph clearly contradicts the conclusion based on 
permanent incomes analysis. If we exclude the individuals who are most suspicious for 
measurement errors and sharp transitory income fluctuations we still have that incomes of the 
poor has grown faster than incomes of the rich over the period. For another sensitivity check we 
averaged incomes for two 3-year sub-periods in order to minimize the influence of transitory 
income variation and measurement error. Figure 9C depicts log income changes between these 
sub-periods. Again the picture is consistent with the story of pro-poor growth with especially 
high growth rates for the lowest decile.  
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So we have to conclude that after correcting for short-term fluctuations in the data Russian 
economic growth in the early 2000s sufficiently strongly favored low-income individuals and 
real incomes of the poor grew faster than incomes in other parts of the distribution. This finding 
is consistent with the recent estimates of the World Bank (World Bank, 2005).  
 
6. Income mobility and pro-poor growth 
In the previous section we showed that economic growth brought dramatic improvement to 
the positions of poorest in the society. Why than in cross-sections we see only modest reduction 
in inequality? Jenkins and Kerm (2006) proposed the way of resolving this potential paradox. 
They developed an analytical framework within which changes in income inequality over time 
are related to the pattern of income growth across the income range and the changing individual 
rankings in the distribution. This methodology can be applied to any measure from the 
generalized Gini class of indices, including a commonly-used Gini coefficient. They prove that 
the change in the Gini coefficient between two time points can be broken down into two 
components – one summarizing changes in relative positions of individuals and one 
summarizing progressivity in income growth. The decomposition is derived by adding and 
subtracting the concentration coefficient ( ) to the change in Gini index (∆Gini): )0(1C
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where  is the concentration coefficient for year 1 incomes which uses year 0 income ranking. 
In geometrical terms it is twice the area between the concentration and the line of perfect 
equality. The idea of concentration curve is similar to Gini. The Gini coefficient is twice the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality. The Lorenz curve shows for the 
cumulative proportion x% of ordered individuals, what cumulative proportion y% of the total 
income they have. Both values refer to the same period. The concentration curve derived from 
the Gini but differs, as the x variable is based on year 0 income order and the y variable is year 1 
incomes. The concentration curve shows the cumulative proportion of year 1 incomes where 
individuals are ordered according to year 0 incomes. 
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Figure 10 depicts the Lorenz and concentration curves for Russia taking 2000 as year 0 and 
2005 as year 1. The decreasing inequality over the period is depicted by the inward shift in the 
Lorenz curve. Twice the area between two Lorenz curves is the change in the Gini coefficient 
(∆Gini). According to equation (6), the difference between the two Lorenz curves can be 
decomposed into two parts. The first part is the difference the difference between the 2000 
Lorenz curve and the 2005 concentration curve based on the 2000 income ranks. This 
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summarizes the effect of pro-poor growth and is equal ( )/2. The second part is the 
difference between the 2005 Lorenz curve and the 2005 concentration curve. It summarizes the 
effect of re-ranking and is equal to ( )/2. This picture suggests that income growth in 
Russia was strongly pro-poor, as the 2005 concentration curve lies everywhere above the Lorenz 
curve for 2000 incomes. This means that incomes of relatively poor were actually growing faster 
than incomes of relatively rich. However, this inequality-reducing effect was almost exactly 
offset by the effect of re-ranking. With pro-poor income growth, the number of individuals who 
were poor in the initial year moved out of low income, but were replaced at the bottom of the 
income distribution by individuals who were non-poor initially and who had slightly higher 
relative incomes in the final year of the period than those whom they replaced. Therefore, an 
overall reduction in cross-sectional inequality was only modest.  
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Tables I.13 and E.13 present these conclusions in a more formal manner for incomes and 
non-durable expenditures, respectively. Over the whole period 2000-2005 inequality decreased 
for incomes but not for expenditures. The first rows of these tables provide the results of the 
decomposition for the entire period. They show that pro-poor growth potentially can lead to a 
tremendous cut in equality. Had there been no re-ranking, and other things being equal, over 
2000-2005 pro-poor income growth would have reduced the Gini coefficient by about 60(!)% for 
both incomes and expenditures. But the equalizing effect of pro-poor income growth was 
counterbalanced by the disequalizing effect of re-ranking (we have seen substantial re-ranking in 
our transition matrices). For incomes the effect of pro-poor growth was slightly higher than the 
effect of re-ranking bringing about a 7% decline in the Gini coefficient. For expenditures the 
progressivity of income growth was more than offset by the re-ranking effect leading to 2% 
increase in Gini. 
Since yearly values of income may be contaminated by measurement errors and transitory 
variation, we averaged incomes and expenditures for two 3-year periods: 2000-2002 and 2003-
2005 and studied changes in inequality of these averages between two sub-periods. Another 
advantage of this procedure is that it allows direct comparisons with the results for the USA and 
West Germany presented in Jenkins and Kerm (2006). They adopt a similar procedure for 6-year 
moving window, averaging incomes for 3-year sub-periods. For incomes the reduction in 
inequality is obviously much smaller when we turn to 3-year averages, but for expenditures 
increase in inequality is also more moderate. However, in what concerns the decomposition the 
results are qualitatively the same. Two effects are of roughly the same magnitude and the effect 
of pro-poor growth only marginally dominates the effect of re-ranking for incomes. And the 
opposite is true for expenditures.  
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For international comparisons Jenkins and Kerm (2006) normalize both effects by initial 
values of the Gini coefficient. In our data the normalized re-ranking and pro-poor growth index 
are equal to 0.30-0.32 and 0.30-0.34, respectively. This by far exceeds the estimates for the USA 
and Germany reported by Jenkins and Kerm. According to their estimates, in the 1980-90s the 
normalized effect of pro-poor growth was equal to approximately 0.12 for the USA and 0.22 for 
West Germany. The normalized effect of re-ranking was in the range of 0.18-0.22 for the USA 
and 0.21-0.27 for West Germany. Both effects are well below our estimates. This finding is 
consistent with other international comparisons presented elsewhere in the paper. Russia 
demonstrates high levels of relative and absolute mobility. Russian society proves to be highly 
dynamic. 
The remainder rows of the tables refer to yearly changes in inequality. For incomes in all 
years except 2000-2001 the effect of pro-poor growth exceeded the effect of re-ranking (in most 
cases by a very small amount) and therefore inequality was declining. For expenditures the effect 
of pro-poor growth exceeded the effect of re-ranking only in 2001-2002. In other years reranking 
played more important role and inequality was rising. For both incomes and expenditures the 
effects of pro-poor growth and re-ranking were larger in the beginning of the period and were 
decreasing over time until 2005 when we see some reversal of the trend. The largest reduction in 
inequality was in 2001-2002 when growth was most favorable for the poor.  
 
7. Decomposition of longitudinal variability of incomes by income sources 
Previous sections have quantified the extent and contributions of relative and absolute 
income mobility in Russia but we have not described the mechanisms through which this 
mobility is realized. This sub-section is aimed to shed some light on this issue. We are not going 
to give a detailed picture of mobility determinants but rather to identify perspective direction for 
the future research. We do this by examining the variance of individual incomes over multiple 
years. The variance of longitudinal income can be decomposed into various income components 
to understand the underlying sources of mobility. The methodology is borrowed from Jenkins 
(2000).  
Let yk denote the income of household from source k. Then total income y=Σyk. For each 
household the variance of total income over T-year period is: 
∑ ∑∑
≠
+==
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yVar σσρσσ 22)(     (7) 
where ρjk is the correlation coefficient between income components yj and yk. For each 
component, the contribution to total income equals to:  
∑
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The proportion of total variability contributed by component k is given by: 
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For each person this is the same as the slope coefficient from regression of the given income 
component on total net income. The average contribution is simply the average of individual 
slope coefficients.  
All income components were classified in 8 groups: private transfers (which includes all 
transfers from relatives, friends and other people; international, religious and other 
organizations), child allowances, alimony, earnings of all household members, pensions, benefit 
income (which includes stipends, unemployment benefits and other type of social assistance 
from the state), investment income (which includes incomes from renting out household assets, 
dividends and interest payments received), and subsidies (which includes fuel and housing 
subsidies). 
Table I.14 provides some longitudinal statistics about per adult equivalent incomes and 
changes in its elements. Household incomes are in the numerator in formula (1). Note these are 
not individual incomes but total incomes of the households. Here we use the definition based on 
the sum of various income components. Household size and equivalence scale are in the 
denominator of (1). They reflect demographic differences between households and subgroups of 
households as well as demographic changes within households over time. The statistics are based 
on incomes averaged over all six periods for each person. The first column of Table I.14 shows 
the averages for the whole sub-sample under consideration. Other columns refer to specific 
population subgroups defined by the type of household. Households are classified into household 
types according to their status in the 2000 wave (which may subsequently change).  
Longitudinally average household incomes for the whole sample are equal to 4882 rubles 
resulting in 2035 rubles of equivalent incomes. Table I.14 shows that for typical household 
earnings constitute the largest part of total incomes. They contribute about three fourth of total 
household incomes. Pensions are also essential: the share of pensions is equal to 17%. All other 
income sources are of minor importance. Private transfers with the share of 2.4% are the largest 
among them. 
Relative importance of each income component varies by household types. These 
differences tell us about which income sources are likely to be most relevant in explaining the 
differential dynamics of equivalent incomes. Incomes of the households comprise of the elderly 
are mostly formed by pensions (73-75% of total incomes) with earnings adding just 14-17% of 
the total. Their income structures are also characterized by larger shares of private transfers 
(particularly, for those who live alone) and greater role played by subsidies. Earnings are by far 
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more important for other types of households especially if kids are present in the households. In 
the latter case the share incomes approaches to 85% of the total. These are mostly households 
composed of kids and young or middle-aged adults, grandfathers and grandmothers are rarely 
present. The number of kids does not affect the structure of incomes.  
Single parents and households without kids have more diverse income structures. Single 
parents rely more to a greater extent on private transfers, alimony and child allowances. 
Households without kids have higher share of their incomes coming from pensions. This is 
because a significant fraction of such households are couples in which one spouse has already 
retired and another spouse is still in pre-retirement age. It worth noting that in spite of a low 
share of private transfers in total incomes, for all household types except households with 2 or 
more kids they constitute a larger share than benefits, subsidies and child allowances taken 
together. Informal social nets seem to be more effective in providing income support and 
insurance than the public safety net. 
Next we turn to the decomposition of longitudinal variability of incomes. What parts of 
incomes are more volatile and sensitive to shocks? What income components are more likely to 
generate transitory fluctuations? Table I.15 gives some answers to these questions. Firstly, it 
provides information about variability of equivalent incomes, household incomes and household 
composition which is summarized in the coefficients of variation for all these indicators. 
Coefficients of variation were calculated longitudinally for each person and then averaged across 
persons. Secondly, it reports the proportionate contributions of each income component to the 
total variability of household incomes employing formula (9). The contribution of each income 
component depends on its share in total household incomes, its own longitudinal variability and 
its covariance with other income sources.  
As it comes from the table, equivalent incomes are only slightly less volatile than total 
household incomes suggesting that demographic events are not the major source of longitudinal 
variation of equivalent incomes and hence they do not contribute much to shape the mobility 
patterns. Longitudinal variation itself is quite large and considerably differs across household 
types. At the one pole there are households composed of the elderly with relatively stable 
incomes. At the other pole there are households with 2 or more kids and single parents whose 
incomes are highly volatile incomes. The conclusion is that future research on mobility should 
put more stress on these groups. 
The middle rows of Table I.15 show the proportionate contributions of income components 
to longitudinal income variability. They are nearly equal to income shares but it is what normally 
happens because more important income sources are also more likely to contribute more to 
longitudinal variability of incomes. For the whole sample the greatest contribution is that of 
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labor incomes – 70% of overall longitudinal variation is explained by variation in earnings. 
However, it is lower than the share of earnings in total incomes (77%). On the contrary, the 
contribution of pensions (23%) is larger than their share in incomes (17%). Our explanation for 
this discrepancy is that in households that receive both pensions and earnings, pensions were less 
than stable over the period than earnings. This finding does not equally apply to all types of 
households. Pensions have considerably higher contributions compared to their share in incomes 
for two types of households: households without kids and, to a lesser extent, households with one 
kid. These particular subgroups form the pattern of contributions for the whole sample. 
Therefore, an important topic for future studies is income mobility by the elderly, especially 
work-to-retirement transition. High contribution of labour incomes into longitudinal variability 
calls for studies on earnings mobility and the mechanisms which speed up earnings growth. 
Private transfers account 2-8% of total longitudinal variation and are extremely volatile. 
We find no evidence of strong stabilizing effect of social benefits and subsidies. Surprisingly, 
but investment incomes and rents better play this role for most household types. In other words, 
social safety net in Russia does not help households to cope with shocks and lift families out of 
poverty. Benefit entitlements are often very small and claiming procedures are very complex, 
and so people take a rational decision that it is not worth claiming the benefits. However, more 
detailed policy-oriented research is needed to assess the effect of public transfers on income 
dynamics. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate the issue of individual income mobility in Russia during the 
period of rapid economic growth in 2000-2005. Incomes are defined as adult equivalent incomes 
using three variants of equivalence scales (q=1, q=0.75 and the OECD equivalence scale) in 
other to make a check of sensitivity of our results on mobility to different economies of scale. 
We repeated analysis for adult equivalent expenditures (total and non-durable) because data on 
expenditures are generally believed to be more reliable than data on incomes. 
Our results may be briefly summarized as follows. Our main finding concerning relative 
income mobility in Russia is that it is roughly of the same magnitude for incomes and 
expenditures both for year-to-year mobility and for mobility over longer periods. Another 
important finding is that relative and absolute mobility in Russia is significantly higher than in 
developed countries. We demonstrate that income growth in Russia was strongly pro-poor in 
2000-2005. Incomes of relatively poor were growing faster than incomes of relatively rich. 
However, this inequality-reducing effect was almost exactly offset by the effect of re-ranking 
and overall reduction in cross-sectional inequality was only modest. Finally, the analysis of 
 31
longitudinal income variation by income sources reveals that earnings mobility is lower than 
overall income mobility but still is the larger contributor to the latter among all sources of 
income. 
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Appendix.  
Table 1. Basic descriptive statistics for the balanced panel and for cross-sections 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  U B U B U B U B U B U B 
Households                   
Household size 2.79 2.82 2.76 2.80 2.75 2.79 2.74 2.77 2.74 2.72 2.74 2.69
Number of children 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.49 0.43
Region                   
Centre 24.3 23.4 27.0 23.4 28.0 23.4 26.8 23.4 26.4 23.4 25.7 23.4
North-West 9.5 8.2 12.4 8.2 12.2 8.2 11.0 8.2 11.3 8.2 11.0 8.2 
South 15.0 15.3 14.2 15.3 14.5 15.3 14.2 15.3 14.2 15.3 14.7 15.3
Volga 23.6 26.9 21.6 26.9 21.7 26.9 22.6 26.9 22.4 26.9 22.4 26.9
Urals 9.6 7.4 7.9 7.4 7.3 7.4 6.1 7.4 6.6 7.4 6.6 7.4 
Siberia 13.1 14.5 12.4 14.5 12.0 14.5 14.7 14.5 14.7 14.5 15.3 14.5
Far East 4.9 4.2 4.7 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.2 
Settlement type                   
Moscow and St. Petersburg 5.5 2.8 14.0 2.8 14.6 2.8 12.5 2.8 12.5 2.8 11.6 2.8 
Regional capital 34.1 32.7 30.3 32.7 29.7 32.7 29.5 32.7 29.8 32.7 29.5 32.7
Other towns 28.2 28.7 25.3 28.7 25.1 28.7 26.8 28.7 26.9 28.7 27.1 28.7
Rural and semi-urban 32.3 35.9 30.4 35.9 30.6 35.9 31.1 35.9 30.8 35.9 31.8 35.9
% of jobless households 28.1 28.0 28.0 28.4 28.0 29.7 26.9 28.9 25.8 29.3 26.2 30.1
% households headed by 
females 25.6 25.3 26.2 25.2 26.6 26.5 26.6 27.3 26.0 26.8 26.4 27.5
Household types                   
Single elderly 13.4 13.0 13.6 13.0 13.4 13.9 13.9 14.9 13.6 15.6 13.8 16.4
Multiple elderly 9.9 11.2 9.6 11.9 9.7 11.9 8.9 11.2 8.8 11.5 7.9 10.7
Other without kids 33.8 32.5 35.0 32.5 35.9 33.0 36.9 34.3 37.6 36.0 38.8 38.4
Single parent 3.6 3.2 3.7 3.4 4.0 3.6 3.7 3.0 3.4 2.7 3.3 2.6 
Other with 1 kid 26.1 26.7 25.9 26.5 25.4 25.4 25.5 24.9 25.7 23.7 25.4 22.3
Other with 2 or more kids 13.3 13.4 12.2 12.9 11.6 12.4 11.2 11.7 11.0 10.4 10.7 9.6 
Average per capita incomes 1370 1222 1785 1526 1968 1690 2094 1848 2257 2007 2546 2316
N of households 3782 2317 4270 2317 4441 2317 4460 2317 4489 2317 4397 2317
Individuals                   
Age, years 37.1 37.7 37.4 38.3 37.4 38.7 37.3 39.1 37.3 39.8 37.3 40.3
Gender: % of males 45.0 44.5 44.7 44.4 44.7 44.2 44.6 43.7 44.6 43.6 44.6 43.8
Education                   
Primary 8.3 8.9 7.2 8.4 6.4 7.7 6.3 7.8 6.0 7.8 5.6 7.4 
Incomplete secondary 23.7 24.6 22.7 24.2 22.9 24.5 23.0 23.9 22.7 23.6 22.0 22.5
Complete secondary 33.5 33.4 34.9 34.0 35.0 34.3 35.1 34.3 34.6 34.2 35.5 35.2
College 19.5 19.6 19.2 19.5 19.3 19.4 19.1 19.8 19.9 19.5 19.5 19.5
University 15.0 13.6 16.1 14.1 16.4 14.1 16.6 14.2 16.9 15.0 17.5 15.5
N of individuals 10537 6544 11794 6494 12210 6469 12211 6408 12303 6296 12039 6236
Note: U – cross-sections, B-balanced panels. All samples are restricted to households with non-missing incomes  
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Table I.2. Income aggregates in the balanced panel and for cross-sections 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cross-sections 
Mean household income, in current rubles 3615 5662 7012 8551 10515 13156 
Mean household incomes, in October 2000 rubles 3615 4710 5045 5419 5940 6643 
Mean per capita income for various income 
aggregates:       
Household incomes based on individual incomes 1140 1469 1638 1770 1904 2165 
Reported household incomes 1238 1582 1741 1911 2072 2345 
Household incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 1215 1600 1801 1931 2066 2310 
Total household incomes 
(per adult equivalent income with q=1) 1370 1785 1968 2094 2257 2546 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 1705 2223 2431 2594 2807 3158 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 1693 2202 2406 2567 2772 3118 
Balanced panel 
Mean household income, in current rubles 3287 4968 6211 7739 9365 11909 
Mean household incomes, in October 2000 rubles 3287 4132 4480 4894 5269 5989 
Mean per capita income for various income 
aggregates:       
Household incomes based on individual incomes 1032 1269 1424 1564 1716 1975 
Reported household incomes 1106 1364 1523 1691 1839 2127 
Household incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 1077 1363 1567 1701 1830 2107 
Total household incomes
(per adult equivalent income with q=1) 1222 1526 1690 1848 2007 2316 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 1532 1918 2110 2306 2496 2869 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 1518 1899 2087 2277 2460 2825 
 
Table E2. Expenditure aggregates in the balanced panel and for cross-sections 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Cross-sections 
Including durables and house restoration       
Mean household expenditures 4578 5035 5176 5421 5876 6057 
Mean per capita expenditures  1692 1909 1999 2115 2276 2368 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 2121 2376 2475 2611 2815 2923 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 2098 2352 2449 2581 2782 2890 
Excluding durables and house restoration             
Mean household expenditures 3472 3919 4110 4070 4604 4694 
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 1276 1474 1534 1484 1676 1740 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 1601 1836 1916 1863 2105 2173 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 1594 1827 1908 1855 2093 2164 
Number of households  3968 4492 4649 4679 4687 4555 
Balanced panel 
Including durables and house restoration       
Mean household expenditures 4341 4696 4765 5009 5325 5576 
Mean per capita expenditures (q = 1) 1542 1701 1765 1871 2021 2152 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 1952 2143 2213 2338 2516 2664 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 1927 2117 2187 2304 2480 2624 
Excluding durables and house restoration       
Mean household expenditures 3729 4078 4103 4263 4524 4667 
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 1357 1497 1538 1602 1738 1838 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 1707 1878 1921 1997 2156 2263 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 1685 1853 1897 1966 2124 2226 
Number of households  2716 2716 2716 2716 2716 2716 
 
Mean log deviation - GE(0) Gini coefficient Half of CV2 - GE(2)   
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Incomes 
Mean per capita income:                                     
Household incomes based on 
individual incomes 0.313 0.321 0.284 0.282 0.258 0.255 0.409 0.407 0.387 0.388 0.375 0.368 0.416 0.447 0.370 0.351 0.318 0.347 
Reported household incomes 0.311 0.316 0.285 0.276 0.249 0.260 0.410 0.408 0.392 0.389 0.374 0.374 0.437 0.449 0.399 0.358 0.353 0.382 
Household incomes based on the 
sum of components of household 
incomes 
0.297 0.309 0.289 0.261 0.232 0.248 0.395 0.400 0.386 0.374 0.360 0.366 0.346 0.396 0.388 0.280 0.273 0.312 
Total household incomes 0.281 0.297 0.266 0.256 0.232 0.235 0.394 0.404 0.382 0.378 0.366 0.365 0.394 0.438 0.374 0.329 0.320 0.371 
Mean per adult equivalent income 
(q=0.75) 0.274 0.292 0.257 0.249 0.229 0.230 0.392 0.404 0.379 0.376 0.365 0.363 0.371 0.438 0.351 0.315 0.301 0.342 
Mean per adult equivalent income 
(OECD scale) 0.273 0.290 0.257 0.249 0.226 0.230 0.391 0.403 0.378 0.375 0.363 0.363 0.374 0.439 0.356 0.317 0.300 0.344 
Expenditures 
All items (including durables and 
house restoration)                   
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.310 0.295 0.296 0.297 0.298 0.316 0.422 0.413 0.411 0.412 0.414 0.423 0.683 0.571 0.505 0.531 0.498 0.541 
Mean per adult equivalent 
expenditures (q=0.75) 0.307 0.289 0.283 0.287 0.287 0.303 0.421 0.409 0.402 0.406 0.408 0.416 0.712 0.561 0.475 0.505 0.465 0.510 
Mean per adult equivalent 
expenditures (OECD scale) 0.307 0.291 0.288 0.289 0.291 0.309 0.421 0.410 0.405 0.407 0.411 0.419 0.690 0.572 0.491 0.508 0.478 0.535 
Excluding durables and house 
restoration                   
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.231 0.233 0.235 0.229 0.239 0.252 0.364 0.367 0.364 0.362 0.372 0.377 0.301 0.332 0.338 0.279 0.324 0.369 
Mean per adult equivalent 
expenditures (q=0.75) 0.222 0.225 0.221 0.219 0.226 0.236 0.358 0.361 0.353 0.355 0.362 0.366 0.281 0.323 0.299 0.262 0.293 0.326 
Mean per adult equivalent 
expenditures (OECD scale) 0.222 0.225 0.225 0.220 0.229 0.240 0.358 0.360 0.355 0.355 0.364 0.368 0.277 0.322 0.309 0.261 0.299 0.337 
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Table 3. Inequality measures for incomes and expenditures, individuals 
 
 
Table I.4. Mobility measures for income aggregates, matched samples of individuals within 
the balanced panel of households 
One-year periods  5 years 
 2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2000-
2005* 
Mean log deviation - GE(0)       
Mean per capita income       
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.214 0.211 0.190 0.179 0.179 0.256 
Reported household incomes 0.198 0.216 0.212 0.200 0.205 0.265 
Household incomes based on the sum of
 components of household incomes 0.204 0.198 0.193 0.174 0.165 0.242 
Total household incomes 0.205 0.217 0.197 0.182 0.171 0.250 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.208 0.221 0.203 0.184 0.173 0.255 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.209 0.221 0.202 0.186 0.174 0.256 
Gini coefficient       
Mean per capita income       
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.089 0.090 0.081 0.071 0.069 0.113 
Reported household incomes 0.088 0.098 0.092 0.082 0.081 0.118 
Household incomes based on the sum of
 components of household incomes 0.088 0.084 0.073 0.068 0.067 0.111 
Total household incomes 0.094 0.097 0.088 0.078 0.075 0.119 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.094 0.099 0.091 0.080 0.077 0.121 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.095 0.100 0.091 0.081 0.077 0.121 
Half of CV2 - GE(2)       
Mean per capita income       
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.257 0.269 0.217 0.203 0.229 0.317 
Reported household incomes 0.272 0.297 0.266 0.248 0.273 0.318 
Household incomes based on the sum of
 components of household incomes 0.237 0.252 0.209 0.167 0.200 0.284 
Total household incomes 0.270 0.297 0.254 0.233 0.267 0.321 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.268 0.299 0.256 0.232 0.259 0.319 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.268 0.299 0.257 0.234 0.261 0.322 
Note: * incomes only in two years (2000 and 2005) are taken into account. 
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Table E.4. Mobility measures for expenditure aggregates, matched samples of individuals 
within the balanced panel of households 
One-year periods    
  2000-
2001 
2001-
2002 
2002-
2003 
2003-
2004 
2004-
2005 
2000-
2005* 
Mean log deviation - GE(0) 
All items (including durables and house restoration)       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.199 0.193 0.177 0.188 0.193 0.284 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.201 0.198 0.182 0.192 0.198 0.287 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.201 0.196 0.180 0.190 0.196 0.286 
Excluding durables and house restoration       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.215 0.208 0.182 0.193 0.190 0.295 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.219 0.215 0.190 0.199 0.199 0.306 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.220 0.215 0.188 0.198 0.197 0.305 
Gini coefficient 
All items (including durables and house restoration)       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.094 0.091 0.083 0.090 0.092 0.133 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.095 0.093 0.086 0.092 0.094 0.136 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.094 0.093 0.085 0.091 0.092 0.135 
Excluding durables and house restoration       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.104 0.099 0.086 0.093 0.089 0.139 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.106 0.101 0.089 0.096 0.094 0.146 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.106 0.102 0.089 0.095 0.093 0.145 
Half of CV2 - GE(2) 
All items (including durables and house restoration)       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.353 0.293 0.312 0.312 0.313 0.403 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.357 0.309 0.318 0.317 0.316 0.417 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.358 0.306 0.316 0.316 0.316 0.411 
Excluding durables and house restoration       
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.255 0.276 0.257 0.253 0.257 0.342 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.246 0.288 0.261 0.255 0.251 0.349 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.253 0.287 0.259 0.252 0.249 0.345 
Note: * expenditures only in two years (2000 and 2005) are taken into account. 
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Table I.5. Mobility measures for cumulated incomes, the balanced panel of individuals 
Time horizon 
CUMULATED INCOMES 2000-
2001 
2000-
2002 
2000-
2003 
2000-
2004 
2000-
2005 
Mean log deviation - GE(0)      
Mean per capita income      
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.214 0.297 0.336 0.356 0.377 
Reported household incomes 0.201 0.293 0.345 0.379 0.406 
Household incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 0.211 0.287 0.326 0.341 0.356 
Total household incomes 0.206 0.298 0.345 0.372 0.392 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.209 0.304 0.350 0.376 0.397 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.210 0.304 0.351 0.378 0.398 
Gini coefficient      
Mean per capita income      
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.088 0.135 0.156 0.167 0.179 
Reported household incomes 0.089 0.139 0.165 0.180 0.195 
Household incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 0.090 0.125 0.145 0.154 0.163 
Total household incomes 0.094 0.144 0.168 0.181 0.194 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.096 0.146 0.171 0.185 0.198 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.096 0.147 0.172 0.185 0.199 
Half of CV2 - GE(2)      
Mean per capita income      
Household incomes based on individual incomes 0.260 0.355 0.382 0.403 0.445 
Reported household incomes 0.280 0.394 0.441 0.468 0.504 
Household incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 0.238 0.338 0.368 0.384 0.418 
Total household incomes 0.275 0.394 0.438 0.460 0.498 
Mean per adult equivalent income (q=0.75) 0.273 0.395 0.440 0.463 0.497 
Mean per adult equivalent income (OECD scale) 0.273 0.395 0.441 0.464 0.499 
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Table E.5. Mobility measures for cumulated expenditure aggregates,  
the balanced panel of individuals 
Time horizon 
 CUMULATED EXPENDITURES 2000-
2001 
2000-
2002 
2000-
2003 
2000-
2004 
2000-
2005 
Mean log deviation - GE(0)      
All items (including durables and house restoration)           
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.200 0.277 0.318 0.360 0.401 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 0.201 0.281 0.323 0.365 0.408 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.201 0.280 0.322 0.364 0.405 
Excluding durables and house restoration      
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.215 0.293 0.328 0.364 0.400 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.219 0.301 0.337 0.373 0.412 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.220 0.301 0.337 0.374 0.411 
Gini coefficient      
All items (including durables and house restoration)           
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.094 0.135 0.157 0.183 0.205 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0.75) 0.095 0.136 0.159 0.185 0.209 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.094 0.136 0.158 0.184 0.207 
Excluding durables and house restoration      
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.104 0.145 0.165 0.186 0.204 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.106 0.149 0.168 0.191 0.211 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.106 0.149 0.169 0.191 0.211 
Half of CV2 - GE(2)      
All items (including durables and house restoration)           
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.356 0.449 0.502 0.539 0.574 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.357 0.460 0.513 0.551 0.586 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.358 0.458 0.511 0.549 0.583 
Excluding durables and house restoration           
Mean per capita expenditures (q=1) 0.255 0.362 0.403 0.442 0.484 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (q=0,75) 0.246 0.365 0.406 0.447 0.488 
Mean per adult equivalent expenditures (OECD scale) 0.253 0.367 0.408 0.446 0.485 
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Table 6. International comparisons 
Country Period MLD Gini GE(2) Source Note 
Russia 1994-1998 0.429 0.217 0.410 Jovanovic (2000) 
Per adult equivalent non-durable 
expenditures (q=0.75), households 
 2000-2005 0.356 0.163 0.418 Authors' 
calculations 
Per capita incomes based on the sum of 
components of household incomes 
 2000-2005 0.397 0.198 0.497 Authors' 
calculations 
Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.75) 
 2000-2005 0.412 0.211 0.488 Authors' 
calculations 
Per adult equivalent non-durable 
expenditures (q=0.75) 
Belgium 1994-1999 0.301 0.145  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Canada 1993-1998 0.199 0.091 0.187 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
Denmark 1994-1999 0.333 0.153  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
 1986-1990  0.054  Aaberge et al 
(2002) 
Administrative data 
France 1994-1999 0.274 0.093  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Germany 1993-1998 0.241 0.109 0.203 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1994-1999 0.252 0.100  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Greece 1994-1999 0.322 0.131  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Ireland 1994-1999 0.169 0.073  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Italy 1994-1999 0.345 0.119  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Netherlands 1994-1999 0.325 0.112  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Norway 1986-1990  0.075  Aaberge et al 
(2002) 
Administrative data 
Portugal 1994-1999 0.228 0.079  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
South Africa 1993, 1998  0.093-
0.116 
 Woolard and 
Klasen (2005) 
Per adult equivalent incomes (α=1, β=0.5, 
q=0.9) 
Spain 1994-1999 0.309 0.101  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
Sweden 1986-1990  0.097  Aaberge et al 
(2002) 
Administrative data 
UK 1991-1994 0.20 0.09 0.29 Jarvis and 
Jenkins (1998) 
 
 1993-1998 0.294 0.124 0.240 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1994-1999 0.251 0.103  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
USA 1993-1998 0.242 0.107 0.230 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1992-1997 0.254 0.092  Gangl (2005) Population aged 25 to 55 (α=0.5 for the 2nd 
adult, 0.3 for other hh members) 
 1986-1990  0.060  Aaberge et al 
(2002) 
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Table I.7. Transition matrix, per adult equivalent income (q=0.75), individuals: 2000-2005 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 Total 
D1 30.3 17.2 9.4 12.3 9.0 5.3 4.9 2.9 3.7 5.1 100.0 
D2 23.9 15.8 12.1 9.3 13.6 7.9 5.7 4.9 3.4 3.4 100.0 
D3 12.4 19.7 15.9 15.6 9.5 7.7 5.5 3.2 6.7 3.9 100.0 
D4 7.7 14.9 18.9 13.2 11.0 11.8 8.5 4.3 6.3 3.5 100.0 
D5 3.1 7.0 16.0 12.9 11.1 12.7 11.9 11.3 7.6 6.4 100.0 
D6 4.9 6.1 9.1 10.5 11.5 11.5 14.8 12.3 11.3 8.1 100.0 
D7 6.5 4.3 6.1 7.1 12.4 11.0 13.8 17.3 10.0 11.4 100.0 
D8 4.3 3.5 6.1 7.8 8.4 17.7 10.6 15.3 16.3 10.0 100.0 
D9 3.2 4.2 5.0 6.9 4.0 6.9 15.8 14.5 19.0 20.6 100.0 
D10 3.9 6.9 1.6 4.7 9.3 7.7 8.5 14.2 15.6 27.6 100.0 
Immobility ratio-1 (%) = 17.3 Moving down (%) = 41.7 
Immobility ratio-2 (%) = 44.9 Moving more than 2 deciles down (%) = 16.5 
Moving up (%) = 40.9 Average absolute jump = 2.26 
Moving more than 2 deciles up (%) = 18.8  
 
Table E.7. Transition matrix, per adult equivalent non-durable expenditures (q=0.75), 
individuals: 2000-2005 
  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 Total 
D1 20.8 20.5 18.5 10.6 5.9 7.6 6.8 2.4 3.0 3.7 100 
D2 14.1 14.8 13.9 15.6 10.4 10.2 7.2 5.7 5.7 2.6 100 
D3 13.7 17.9 7.0 13.0 12.4 11.0 7.3 7.5 6.9 3.4 100 
D4 12.0 10.8 10.8 12.4 13.3 9.8 14.0 6.3 7.9 2.7 100 
D5 8.8 8.5 9.9 9.6 12.5 14.3 9.1 9.7 9.3 8.2 100 
D6 6.3 8.6 11.6 13.0 12.4 8.7 8.9 11.3 9.0 10.2 100 
D7 7.5 5.3 8.5 6.9 11.4 12.2 11.3 14.3 13.3 9.3 100 
D8 7.4 4.5 7.9 6.2 11.3 8.0 15.0 12.4 12.8 14.5 100 
D9 4.1 6.4 6.0 5.5 5.4 10.7 12.1 16.4 18.9 14.4 100 
D10 5.5 2.3 6.0 7.2 5.4 7.0 8.3 14.6 13.0 30.8 100 
Immobility ratio-1(%) = 14.9 Moving down (%) = 41.6 
Immobility ratio-2 (%) = 39.6 Moving more than 2 deciles down (%) = 10.9  
Moving up (%) = 43.5 Average absolute jump = 2.47 
Moving more than 2 deciles up (%) = 20.5  
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Table 8. Transition matrices: summary measures (year-to-year), individuals – per adult 
equivalents 
 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 
Incomes 
Immobility ratio-1 (%) 25.8 24.5 26.6 25.8 26.5 
Immobility ratio-2 (%) 55.8 54.0 57.8 57.4 59.2 
% moving up 37.0 38.0 36.2 35.5 37.2 
% moving more than 2 deciles up  14.5 14.5 12.3 12.9 12.2 
% moving down 37.1 37.5 37.3 38.7 36.3 
% moving more than 2 deciles down 14.2 14.2 12.5 12.0 12.3 
Average absolute jump 1.87 1.92 1.78 1.73 1.66 
Non-durable expenditures 
Immobility ratio-1 (%) 18.8 19.0 20.9 21.4 21.8 
Immobility ratio-2 (%) 48.3 48.4 49.3 51.7 51.2 
% moving up 40.2 41.2 38.6 38.9 39.3 
% moving more than 2 deciles up  16.1 15.8 14.1 15.1 14.9 
% moving down 41.0 39.8 40.4 39.7 38.8 
% moving more than 2 deciles down 7.8 8.4 7.4 7.7 8.0 
Average absolute jump 2.07 2.04 1.91 1.93 1.95 
 
Table 9. Absolute mobility: Fields-Ok index, per adult equivalents (q=0.75) 
Incomes Non-durable  expenditures Time period M MG(%) MT(%) M MG(%) MT(%) 
2000-2001 0.551 41.9 58.1 0.501 19.9 80.1 
2001-2002 0.525 22.9 77.1 0.480 1.9 98.1 
2002-2003 0.472 25.0 75.0 0.452 11.4 88.6 
2003-2004 0.433 24.6 75.4 0.458 12.4 87.6 
2004-2005 0.425 31.3 68.7 0.465 5.5 94.5 
2000-2005 0.844 82.7 17.3 0.638 38.1 61.9 
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Table 10. Absolute log income movements: international comparisons, longer periods 
Country Period Fields- OK index MG MT Source Note 
Russia 2000-05 0.844 82.7 17.3 Authors' calculations 
Per adult equivalent incomes 
(q=0.75) 
Canada 1996-00 0.332 39.7 60.3 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1999-03 0.317 26.6 73.4 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
USA 1996-00 0.444 30.0 70.0 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
UK 1993-97 0.373 27.4 72.6 Ayala & Sastre (2008) 
Modified OECD equivalence scale 
(α=0.5, β=0.3, q=1) 
 1993-97 0.392 22.5 77.5 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1996-00 0.388 26.9 73.1 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1998-02 0.416 30.0 70.0 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
Germany 1993-97 0.254 1.8 98.2 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1993-97 0.309 19.1 80.9 Ayala & Sastre (2008) 
Modified OECD equivalence scale 
(α=0.5, β=0.3, q=1) 
 1996-00 0.269 23.7 76.3 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
 1998-02 0.270 24.9 75.1 Chen (2006) Per adult equivalent incomes (q=0.5) 
China 1993-97 0.847   Ding & Wang (2008) Household incomes 
 1997-00 0.757   Ding & Wang (2008) Household incomes 
France 1993-97 0.250 33.5 66.5 Ayala & Sastre (2008) 
Modified OECD equivalence scale 
(α=0.5, β=0.3, q=1) 
Italy 1993-97 0.360 4.6 95.4 Ayala & Sastre (2008) 
Modified OECD equivalence scale 
(α=0.5, β=0.3, q=1) 
Spain 1993-97 0.390 1.4 98.6 Ayala & Sastre (2008) 
Modified OECD equivalence scale 
(α=0.5, β=0.3, q=1) 
 
 
Table I.11. Absolute log income movements (2000-2005) by deciles of income distribution, 
Fields-Ok index (the balanced panel of individuals) 
Decile 
position 
Decile 
position 
defined 
in 2000 
Relative 
contribution 
to overall 
mobility 
% of 
losers
Decile 
position 
defined 
in 2005
Relative 
contribution 
to overall 
mobility 
% of 
losers
Decile 
position in 
the 
"permanent" 
incomes 
distribution 
Relative 
contribution 
to overall 
mobility 
% of 
losers
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Entire  
sample 0.840  14.0 0.840  14.0 0.840  14.0 
1 1.658 19.8 1.4 0.706 8.4 40.2 0.992 11.8 12.9 
2 1.070 12.8 4.1 0.637 7.5 24.9 0.881 10.5 13.9 
3 0.912 10.9 4.1 0.611 7.3 15.8 0.845 10.0 11.5 
4 0.804 9.6 4.7 0.746 8.9 17.6 0.806 9.6 16.8 
5 0.824 9.9 3.7 0.828 9.9 11.7 0.847 10.1 14.0 
6 0.757 8.9 10.2 0.774 9.2 9.6 0.852 10.2 12.9 
7 0.701 8.4 13.7 0.840 10.0 7.4 0.759 9.0 15.0 
8 0.535 6.4 20.1 0.872 10.3 9.3 0.891 10.6 14.1 
9 0.554 6.6 23.7 1.014 12.0 2.5 0.735 8.8 13.7 
10 0.583 6.9 54.4 1.374 16.3 0.8 0.794 9.4 15.1 
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Table 12. “Duration” of poverty and richness 
Number of 
years in the 
bottom quintile 
% of 
individuals 
Number of 
years in the top 
quintile 
% of 
individuals 
0 53.2 0 50.6 
1 16.4 1 19.5 
2 10.0 2 11.7 
3 7.6 3 6.6 
4 5.6 4 4.5 
5 4.5 5 3.5 
6 2.7 6 3.6 
N 4873 
 
 
Table I.13. Decomposition of changes in income inequality 
Initial year Final year Initial Gini Final Gini ∆Gini Reranking Pro-poor growth 
Entire period 
2000 2005 0.387 0.360 -0.027 0.207 0.234 
2000-02 2003-05 0.330 0.319 -0.011 0.101 0.112 
Yearly 
2000 2001 0.387 0.397 0.010 0.173 0.164 
2001 2002 0.397 0.378 -0.019 0.171 0.189 
2002 2003 0.378 0.368 -0.010 0.148 0.157 
2003 2004 0.368 0.362 -0.007 0.122 0.129 
2004 2005 0.362 0.360 -0.002 0.124 0.126 
 
Table E.13. Decomposition of changes in expenditures inequality (non-durables) 
Initial year Final year Initial Gini Final Gini ∆Gini Reranking Pro-poor growth 
Entire period 
2000 2005 0.358 0.366 0.008 0.219 0.211 
2000-02 2003-05 0.304 0.309 0.005 0.096 0.091 
Yearly 
2000 2001 0.358 0.361 0.003 0.155 0.152 
2001 2002 0.361 0.353 -0.008 0.146 0.154 
2002 2003 0.353 0.355 0.002 0.132 0.130 
2003 2004 0.355 0.362 0.007 0.138 0.130 
2004 2005 0.362 0.366 0.003 0.145 0.141 
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Table I.14. Composition of incomes by income source 
Household type 
 All persons Single elderly 
Multiple 
elderly 
Other 
without 
kids 
Single 
parent 
Other 
with 1 
kid 
Other 
with 2 
or more 
kids 
Per adult equivalent income 
(average for 2000-2005) 2035 1413 1838 2358 1954 2191 1620 
Household income (average 
for 2000-2005) 4882 1536 3082 5024 4119 5654 4871 
Income source as % of 
household income        
Private transfers 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Child allowances 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Earnings 0.77 0.14 0.17 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.84 
Pensions 0.17 0.73 0.75 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.10 
Benefit income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Investment income and rents 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Alimony 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Subsidies 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Household size 3.34 1.12 2.00 2.79 2.59 3.60 4.54 
Equivalence scale (hh 
size^0.75) 2.43 1.08 1.68 2.13 2.02 2.59 3.09 
Number of persons 3812 160 291 1059 103 1290 909 
As % of all persons  100.0% 4.2% 7.6% 27.8% 2.7% 33.8% 23.8% 
 
Table I.15. Longitudinal variability of income and household size, and the proportionate 
contribution of income components to longitudinal income variability 
Household type 
 All persons Single elderly 
Multiple 
elderly 
Other 
without 
kids 
Single 
parent 
Other 
with 1 
kid 
Other 
with 2 or 
more kids
CV (per adult equivalent 
income) 0.44 0.31 0.30 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.50 
CV (household income) 0.45 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.51 
Proportionate contribution of 
income component to 
longitudinal income 
variability 
       
Private transfers 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 
Child allowances 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Earnings 0.70 0.10 0.14 0.68 0.74 0.83 0.83 
Pensions 0.23 0.77 0.77 0.27 0.12 0.11 0.10 
Benefit income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Investment income and rents 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Alimony 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Subsidies 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
CV (household size) 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.08 
CV (equivalence scale=hh 
size^0.75) 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.06 
Number of persons 3812 160 291 1059 103 1290 909 
As % of all persons  100.0% 4.2% 7.6% 27.8% 2.7% 33.8% 23.8% 
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Figure 2. Dynamics of per adult equivalent incomes and expenditures (q=0.75) 
 
Figure 1. Changes in log per capita incomes: 2000-2005 (the balanced panel) 
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Figure 3. Evolution of inequality: per adult equivalents (q=0.75) 
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Figure 4. Year-to-year mobility of per adult equivalent incomes and  
non-durable expenditures (q=0.75) 
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Figure 5. Mobility of cumulated per adult equivalent incomes and  
non-durable expenditures (q=0.75) 
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Figure 6. Percentage of staying in the same decile group (immobility ratio -1) 
Source: Chen (2006). 
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Figure 8. Fields-Ok index: international comparisons 
Source: Russia – authors’ calculations: Canada, Germany, UK, USA - Chen (2006). 
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B. Excluding those only one year poor or rich over the period  
Figure 9. Change in log-incomes between 2000 and 2005 
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Figure 10. Decomposition of inequality change 
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